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Abstract 
In the thirty-three years since the April 25, 1974, Carnation Revolution, there have been sporadic 
efforts by progressive forces to legalize abortion in Portugal. This activity has intensified over the 
past nine years, culminating with two national referenda on the subject, one in 1998 which nar-
rowly affirmed the ban on abortion, and the second in 2007 which allowed for the procedure dur-
ing the first ten weeks of pregnancy. One reason that the abortion debate in Portugal attracted 
much interest in the world press was what it would potentially teach about the Roman Catholic 
Church’s contemporary role in Portuguese society. That is, would the Church maintain its tradi-
tional influential role over public policy formation in a secularizing Portugal, especially related to 
its moral teaching? There is some controversy about the type of secularization which is taking 
place (i.e., Portuguese-style secularization may be of a different sort than that of Northern Euro-
pean countries), but there is little doubt that the Church’s ability to define morality for its mem-
bers has been reduced in recent years. The Church now competes with many secular voices to 
frame issues such as sexuality, marriage, divorce and abortion. The recent vote to legalize abor-
tion—a move bitterly opposed by the Church—is but one of many examples symbolizing a drift 
in Portuguese society toward secularization. There was another dimension to the national debate 
over abortion as well: the pro-choice side successfully harmonized its rhetoric to certain tradi-
tional communal values found in Portuguese society—namely compassion, solidarity and sup-
port—and, in so doing, forged a recovery of those values. In the thirty-three years since the April 25, 1974,  Carnation Revolution, there 
have been sporadic efforts by progressive forces to legalize abortion in Portugal. This ac-
tivity has intensified over the past nine years, culminating in two national referenda on 
the subject, one in 1998 which narrowly affirmed the ban on abortion, and the second in 
2007 which allowed for the procedure during the first ten weeks of pregnancy. Prior to 
the 2007 vote, Portugal’s abortion laws had been distinctly conservative among other 
European nations. Malta, Poland and Ireland are the only other European nations that 
have laws prohibiting abortion on demand (Financial Times, 2007). 
 
Abortion continues to be a contentious issue across the globe, particularly in the 
United States and Southern Europe. One reason that the abortion debate in Portugal at-
tracted such interest in the world press was what it could potentially teach about the 
Roman Catholic Church’s contemporary role in Portuguese society. That is, would the 
Church maintain its traditional influential role over public policy formation, especially 
related to its moral teaching? Since the democratic transition of the 1970s, the Roman Ca-
tholic Church has sought to assert its moral voice in the Portuguese public square, all the 
while being opposed by a growing number of citizens who reject its authority to do so. 
There is some controversy about the type of secularization taking place in Portugal (i.e., 
Portuguese-style secularization may be of a different sort than that of Northern Euro-
pean countries), but there is little doubt that the Church’s ability to define morality for 
its members has been reduced in recent years. The Church now competes with many 
secular voices to frame issues such as sexuality, marriage, divorce and abortion. The re-
cent decision by Portugal to legalize abortion—a move bitterly opposed by the Church— 
is but one of many examples symbolizing a drift in Portuguese society toward seculari-
zation (Manuel et al 2006). 
 
The abortion debate in Portugal was both complex and multi-dimensional. Argu-
ably, the former law banning abortion was in harmony with how the issue of life has tra-
ditionally been understood by significant sectors of Portuguese civil society. Let us cite a 
few examples. To begin with, the country is a pioneer among European countries in the 
movement against capital punishment, having eliminated the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes in 1867, and for all crimes in 1976 (European Union, 2007). Even the laws govern-
ing Portuguese bullfighting make it illegal for the matador to kill the bull at the end of a 
fight.1 Perhaps most important, the familial nature of Portuguese society has always 
been a bonding element of communal and societal life, and the bringing of a new child 
into the world has traditionally been greeted with great celebration. Life is highly valued 
in Portugal and, as such, significant sectors of civil society needed time to absorb all of 
the implications raised by the prospect of ending the ban on abortion. 
 
Let us briefly suggest three interlocking sets of issue clusters which oriented the 
abortion debate in Portugal. First, there is the question of modernity. The abortion debate 
ignited the centuries-old societal cleavage line over the issue of clericalism versus anti-
clericalism, and the outcome represents a step away from laws nurtured under the mor-
al teachings and political influence of the Roman Catholic Church and perhaps towards 
                                                 
1The law, which was enacted in 1928, has a heavy penalty for offenders. In 2007, a celebrated 
Portuguese bullfighter was fined $137,000 for killing a bull at the end of a fight (New York Times 
2007).  
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a new modern, secular and rights-based era. Second, the fulfillment of the democratic prom-
ises of the April 25 revolution: the 2007 referendum was made possible thanks to the de-
mocratic transition ushered in by the April 1974 Revolution, enabling the people to have 
the final say on questions of public policy. Public policy choices in Portugal are no 
longer the exclusive purview of narrow cultural, political, military or economic elites, as 
had been the case for much of the twentieth century. Rather, the core democratic princi-
ple that governmental legitimacy requires a mandate of the people has become well en-
trenched in the thirty-some years of democratic practice since the April revolution. 
Third, the issue of compassion and communal values: between 1998 and 2007 the pro-choice 
movement gained traction as a reaction to the criminalization of women who had abor-
tions and the doctors and nurses who had made the procedure possible (The Independent, 
1998). Many Portuguese were horrified by the thought that women found guilty of 
having hadd an abortion faced up to three years in prison or a $20,000 fine. In light of 
this generalized feeling, progressive forces started to move their political strategy away 
from the rhetoric of “reproductive rights” and towards the need for sympathy and sup-
port for women in trouble. This shift in strategy, along with the strong pro-choice sup-
port of Prime Minister Jose Socrates, contributed to the growing public unease towards 
the abortion ban in the early 2000s.  
 
The 1998 Debate 
 
In 1979, the debate to legalize abortion began after two famous trials brought the 
issue to the forefront of the political agenda.2 While neither of the defendants was found 
guilty, these trials nonetheless opened the door for progressive groups to demand that 
the issue be reexamined. A reform law was passed in 1984 that changed the strict, zero- 
tolerance abortion law to one which permitted abortion in certain cases; namely, in the 
case of a “risk to the woman’s life, risk to her physical or mental health, fetal malforma-
tion, and pregnancy resulting from rape” (Vilar 2002).  
 
Following the election of a Socialist majority government in the National Assem-
bly in 1995, two new bills that called for the legalization of abortion by request were sub-
mitted to the National Assembly (Vilar 2002). At this point a division within the Socialist 
Party on abortion appeared when Socialist Prime Minister António Guterres, a pro-life 
Roman Catholic, tabled the legislative proposals. Undeterred, pro-choice groups contin-
ued to lobby for a change in the law and, in February 1998, the National Assembly 
passed a bill that provided for an abortion in the first ten weeks of pregnancy with cer-
tain conditions.3 Prime Minister Guterres profoundly opposed the bill, and argued that 
the constitution required that this change be ratified by a mandate from the people in 
                                                 
2There were two trials in 1979. The first trial was of a journalist who produced a TV program on 
abortion. He was tried for moral outrage. The second trial involved a student nurse who had an 
abortion (Vilar 2002). 
3‘Portugal legalizes abortion against protests,’ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 5, 1998. 
Available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?ri
sb=21_T2864608164&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T28
64608167&cisb=22_T2864608166&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=144245&docNo=1 (accessed 
September 2007).  
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the form of a national referendum. According to the Portuguese constitution, “the voting 
citizens enrolled on the national territory may be called upon to express themselves di-
rectly and on a mandatory basis” in a referendum. In addition, “[E]ach referendum 
deals with one single matter; the questions are formulated objectively, clearly, precisely, 
and in such terms as to require a yes or no answer” (Portuguese Constitution 1976).  
 
The Prime Minister’s tactic of calling for the referendum was a source of great 
controversy among members of the National Assembly. Some contended that António 
Guterres had violated the Portuguese constitution, which does not allow for measures 
passed by the National Assembly to be put to a national referendum (Freire and Baum 
2003). And yet, as Freire and Baum (2003) have observed, a political deal, which allowed 
the measure to go to the people, was worked out between Guterres and Social Democ-
ratic leader Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, leading to the first referendum on abortion in June 
1998.  
  
The campaign period ran from June 16-26, 1998, and was characterized by great 
acrimony between the pro-life and pro-choice sides—which had ramifications for the 
age-old clerical/anti-clerical divide.4 In a conscious effort to limit the resurgence of this 
cleavage, the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy requested that its priests and nuns re-
frain from political activism. At the same time, as a theological issue, religious leaders 
were asked to speak against “the intrinsic evil of abortion” in church or other appropri-
ate venues.5 This strategy was very much in keeping with the reforms of the Second 
Vatican Council, which sought to get the Church out of close partnership with govern-
mental power, all the while maintaining a robust moral teaching posture in Iberian so-
ciety (Manuel, 2002). 
 
There was also a significant divide within the Socialist Party. Prime Minister 
Guterres announced his intention to vote against the legalization of abortion, even as his 
Socialist parliamentary colleague Sergio de Sousa Pinto—who had helped draft the ori-
ginal abortion bill—was campaigning to legalize the procedure. In Sousa Pinto’s view, 
the new law was necessary given “the terrible public health problem associated with il-
                                                 
4The three most important documents relating to religious freedom in contemporary Portugal are 
the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, the 2001 Religious Freedom Act and the 1940 Concordat. 
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Religious Freedom Act grants non-
Catholic religions the same benefits previously only ascribed to the Roman Catholic Church, and 
the 1940 Concordat between the Portuguese government and the Vatican is currently being re-
vised in light of Vatican II understandings of church-state relations. All of this is quite distinct 
from the virulently anti-clerical and secular Lei de Separação (Church/State separation law) of 
1911, which actually placed the Church under the control of the state. Civil authorities are dia-
loguing with the Church authorities to allow for both secular and clerical space in Portuguese so-
ciety. In short, these new procedures and understanding adopted since the Second Vatican Coun-
cil in the 1960s and the Portuguese democratic transition in the 1970s invite the Catholic Church 
to participate in public policy process, but not to control it (Manuel and Mott, 2006). 
5Accordingly, many Catholic figures used their voices through media outlets to appeal to the 
large Portuguese Catholic community arguing that “the right to life is inviolable and cannot be 
discussed.” The same was true during the 2007 debate, see Aborto: «Missa não é local de campanha 
Escreve o cardeal-patriarca de Lisboa numa nota dirigida aos padres on January 12, 2007. Information 
available at http://www.rtp.pt/index.php?article=266519&visual=16  
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legal abortion carried out under improper conditions, which is an offence to human dig-
nity” (The Irish Times, 1998).  
 
The split in the party had dire consequences for pro-choice Socialists who could 
not unify their party and mobilize voters. The 1995 legislative elections proved Portu-
guese support for the PS. The PS had received 43.76 percent of vote in the legislative 
elections with the PPD/PSD receiving only 34.12 percent (Marktest, 2007). A united So-
cialist message could have determined the outcome of the referendum, but its force  was 
weakened because of the divide in the party. In addition, the Democratic Social Center 
and a majority of the Social Democratic Party maintained a pro-life posture, significantly 
mitigating the pro-choice stance of the Communist and Green Party among the elector-
ate.6  
 
Interest groups were very active during the campaign. The week before the refer-
endum thousands of pro-choice activists held a march at Lisbon’s Parliament Square. 
Many of these activists argued that the high number of deaths caused from clandestine 
abortions each year should not be ignored. According to some health experts, there were 
as many as 16,000 illegal and 280 legal abortions each year. In addition, around 12,000 
women in 1997 had been hospitalized with complications resulting from clandestine 
abortions (Christian Science Monitor, 1998). Duarte Vilar, the Executive Director of the 
Portuguese Family Planning Association, contended that the law banning abortion was 
hypocritical because the procedure was fairly common.7 Vilar and his pro-choice allies 
had to contend with a pro-life Socialist Prime Minister, the moral teachings of the Catho-
lic Church and a pro-life center-right parliamentary group. 
 
The referendum question read: “Do you agree with the decriminalization of the 
voluntary interruption of  pregnancy, if it takes place in the first 10 weeks and in an au-
thorized healthcare institution” (CNE Resultados 2007). A “yes” vote would have ended 
the ban on abortion, whereas a “no” vote would maintain the ban. Let us fast-forward to 
the results in the 1998 referendum: 50.9 percent voted “no” and 49.1 percent voted “yes” 
(see Table 1, p. 10). That is, a 1 percent majority voted to maintain restrictions on abor-
tion—but there is more to this story. 
 
                                                 
6(1998) “Portugal legalizes abortion against protests,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 5. Also see 
“Cardeal D. José Policarpo diz que aborto é uma atitude egoísta,” on January 23, 2007; 
http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=764989 
7In Vilar’s words, “It [abortion] has always been a part of life here. Everyone knows where to 
have an abortion in Portugal, including judges, the police and all the authorities. It has been very 
consistent, both before and after the revolution in 1974: the state always wanted to say publicly 
that they were against abortion and that they had banned it, but there has always been a culture 
of tolerance towards abortions” (The Irish Times, 1998).   
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Map 1: Results of the 1998 Abortion Referendum by District Location 
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There was a very large abstention rate. The referendum required 50 percent of 
registered voters to participate to legitimize the vote, but only 31.5 percent of registered 
voters cast ballots, with 68.1 percent of eligible voters abstaining.8 Some have argued 
that the sunny weather and the football world cup may have contributed to the low 
voter turnout.9 In addition, several other sociological explanations for the low turnout 
rate have been offered. One view contends that, since the referendum caused many vot-
ers to vote against the stated positions of their political party, they may have decided to 
abstain. Another explanation focuses on the early media reports of a “yes” victory, 
which may have had the unintended consequence of demobilizing voters who believed 
that there was no reason to turn out at the polls, driving up the abstention rate and keep-
ing abortion-rights supporters at home (Freire and Baum 2002). It is important to note 
that there was a high abstention rate in a later regionalization referendum held in No-
vember of the same year, which may indicate the abstention rate was not a result of the 
issue at hand but of the country’s new democratic system.  
 
The geographical voting pattern was heavily divided between northern and 
southern districts. As indicated in Map 1, all of the northern districts, with the exception 
of Coimbra, voted “no,” while all of the southern districts voted “yes” to legalizing abor-
tion. The two autonomous regions of Açores and Madeira each voted “no” by large per-
centages. The results were mixed in urban areas: 67.97 percent in the greater Lisbon area 
voted “yes” while 57.19 percent in greater Oporto area voted “no” (Marktest 2007). 
Marina Costa Lobo has usefully argued that regional economic conditions control this 
geographical ideological division, observing the causal relationship between a country’s 
economic development and its modern identity (Lobo cited in Boston Globe 2004). Lisbon 
and Setubal are two of the richest urban areas in Portugal and each voted to legalize 
abortion; the reverse was the case in the less developed areas (The Independent, 2001). 
This lack of modern development may be one reason for the disparity between the secu-
larized urban areas and the rural north. 
 
1998-2007  
 
Although the low voter turnout invalidated the final result in 1998, the Socialist 
party decided not to push for the legalization of abortion in the aftermath of the referen-
dum.10 However, the issue returned to the headlines when a mid-wife was arrested in 
February 2000, for illegally performing abortions. This woman, Maria do Ceu Ribeiro, 
was accused of “repeated illegal practice of abortion, fraud, forgery of documents and 
                                                 
8(1998) “Portuguese voters reject reform of abortion laws,’ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 28. 
Available at  
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?ri
sb=21_T2864626118&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T28
64626122&cisb=22_T2864626121&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=144245&docNo=1 (accessed 
September 2007).  
9(1998) “Portugal to withdraw law permitting abortion,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 29. Avail-
able at: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do 
(accessed September 2007).  
10(1998) “World: Europe: Portugal’s abortion bill abandoned,” BBC News, June 28. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/121970.stm (accessed September 2007).  
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drug trafficking.”11 She was found guilty and sentenced to eight and a half years in pris-
on. Ribeiro performed abortions in an “impoverished clinic” at her home. Other women 
were accused of havng abortions at Ribeiro’s clinic but many of the women involved 
were not punished or were given reduced sentences. Right to Choose Groups, women’s 
organizations and leftist parliament members were horrified that women who had 
abortions were being put in jail.12   
 
By 2004, there were even more trials and controversies surrounding the abortion 
issue. For instance, a court in the northern Portuguese district of Aveiro acquitted seven 
women who were accused of having abortions in February of 2004,13 even though that 
district had voted “no” in the 1998 referendum by a 67.73 percent to 32.27 percent vote 
(Marktest 2007). This court verdict may very well have been a telling sign of the change 
of opinion on women and illegal abortion in a traditionally conservative northern dis-
trict. That is, many conservative leaders who were against abortion could not support 
sending women to jail for aborting. 
 
The debate heated up during the legislative elections in 2005. The new, pro-
choice, Socialist Party leader, Jose Socrates, vowed to hold a new referendum on abor-
tion if he were elected Prime Minister. His electoral campaign was a success. As Prime 
Minister, he called for a new referendum because of what he saw as the “signs of 
change” in Portuguese society, as well as the “persisting drama of illegal abortion.”14 For 
                                                 
11Excerpt from report by Portuguese radio. (2002) “Portugal: Pro-abortion campaigners call for 
change in law,” BBC Monitoring Europe, January 18.  
Available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?ri
sb=21_T2864642280&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T 
2864642283&cisb=22_T2864642282&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=1 (accessed 
August 2007). 
12Many protested the trials by signing petitions to end the law, while others protested outside the 
site of the trial. Francisco Louca, the leader of the Left Block [BE] articulated well the pro-choice 
position at that moment in Portugal with this observation, “The court was a prisoner of the law 
and this is why the crime was the trial itself. Having to try people who chose to terminate their 
pregnancies, to have an abortion, is a situation that cannot be allowed to continue in Portugal.” 
“Portugal: Pro-abortion campaigners call for change in law,” BBC Monitoring Europe, January 18.  
Available at: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?ri
sb=21_T2864642280&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T28
64642283&cisb=22_T2864642282&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=1 (accessed 
August 2007).  
13Radio excerpt. (2004) “Portuguese court acquits women accused of illegal abortion,” BBC Moni-
toring Europe, February 17. Available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do 
(accessed September 2007).  
14Publico web site. (2005) “Portugal to hold new referendum on abortion, premier says,” BBC 
Monitoring Europe, March 21. Available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?ri
sb=21_T2864659092&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T28
64659095&cisb=22_T2864659094&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=1 (accessed 
September 2007).  Not all Socialists were in agreement with the Prime Minister, Socialistas católicos  
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its part, the Catholic Church reaffirmed its stance against abortion. The Patriarch of Lis-
bon, Cardinal Dom Jose Policarpo, argued that “the issue of abortion is not exclusively 
religious, but one of natural order because respect for life is the fundamental aim of eth-
ics.”15 His argument targeted the moral, ethical and religious conscience of the Portu-
guese community. After a period of negotiation with President Jorge Sampaio, Prime 
Minister Socrates finally scheduled the new referendum for February 11, 2007.16 
 
February 2007 
 
This second referendum featured new campaign strategies from the pro-choice 
forces. During the 1998 abortion debate, the pro-choice side focused primarily on the 
rhetoric of a “women’s right to choose,” with the pro-choice slogan of “My belly is mine 
and I’ll do what I want with it” (The New York Times 2007). This strategy did not appeal 
to a majority of Portuguese voters. In 2007, given the estimated 23,000 illegal abortions 
in Portugal annually, and the over 10,000 Portuguese women hospitalized because of 
these clandestine abortions, pro-choice groups decided to focus on the human suffering 
under the ban on abortion (Jurist 2007). Their campaign’s new slogan, “A Responsible 
Yes” helped the pro-choice movement appear compassionate, moderate and reasonable. 
This strategy, invoked by the Communists, Left Bloc and Greens, publicized the many 
deaths, injuries and psychological damage that resulted from clandestine abortions. In 
the end, this strategy was much more effective then the strategy used in 1998, which al-
most exclusively focused on a woman’s right to choose (The Times: London 2007).  
 
In response, pro-life forces fought to protect the country from “moral decay.” 
Many Catholic leaders contended that the legalization of abortion would lead to a “slip-
pery slope” that would end with the legalization of gay marriage (The Times: London 
2007). The Church also argued that abortion clinics would economically profit from the 
law. Pro-life groups argued that pregnancy prevention programs were the best solution 
to unwanted pregnancy in the country with the second highest teen pregnancy rate in 
Europe (Financial Times 2007). The Church remained influential in the pro-life debate 
during this time and its moral suasion, especially in northern, rural areas, was undeni-
able.  
 
Right-to-life groups countered the actions of Right to Choose Groups with ap-
peals to the moral conscience of the people. For example, in the Roman Catholic-run 
day-care centers in the city of Setubal, children were sent home with a letter from voices 
of dead fetuses addressed to their parents. The letter, written by Rev. Miguel Alves, said, 
“Mummy, how were you able to kill me?” (The New York Times 2007). This attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                 
contra o aborto 2007/01/10, Edite Estrela e Jorge Coelho presentes no lançamento do movimento, 
Portugal Diário,  http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=760244 
15Diario de Noticias web site. (2005) “Patriarch of Lisbon against Portugal’s plans for abortion 
referendum.” BBC Monitoring Europe, April 5. Available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do 
(accessed August 2007).  
16Publico web site. (2005) “Portuguese president postpones abortion referendum until 2006,” BBC  
Monitoring Europe, May 2. Available at: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do 
(accessed September 2007).  
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appeal to Catholic voters was met with mixed emotions. Many anti-abortion activists 
were disgusted by the tactic, including Manuel De Lemos, the operator of the Confeder-
ation of Catholic charitable organizations (The New York Times 2007). Less controversial 
actions were also taken by the pro-life side, including anti-abortion messages through 
radio broadcasts and pamphlets. Leaflets were extensively passed out at the Marian 
shrine at Fatima where a group of bishops gathered on February 11, 2007 (The Guardian 
2007).  
 
The political parties aligned as in the 1998 referendum. The Portuguese Commu-
nist Party, the Greens, Left Bloc and the Portuguese Socialist Party all fought to legalize 
abortion. Conversely, the Democratic Social Center and important members of the Social 
Democratic Party worked alongside pro-life forces to maintain the ban on abortion. The 
Social Democratic Party faced opposition from members of its own party but maintained 
its strength as an anti-abortion force under the leadership of Luís Marques Mendes, the 
head of the Social Democratic Party (Socialist Worker 2007). The 2005 parliamentary elec-
tions reaffirmed the strength of the PS and PSD. The PS received 45.03 percent of the vote 
and the PPD/PSD received 28.77 percent of the vote, leaving the PS in a strong position to 
influence voters’ decisions in the referendum (Marktest 2007).  
 
Polls leading up to the referendum indicated that the public would vote to relax 
the ban on abortion. However, many on the pro-choice side were concerned that there 
would not be enough ballots cast to validate the vote. Consequently Prime Minister Jose 
Socrates started to urge younger voters—who tended to support the legalization of abor-
tion, but also had the highest level of abstention in the 1998 referendum—to vote.17 The 
ability of the pro-choice side to mobilize young voters became quickly understood as a 
crucial measure to achieving a 50 percent turnout.  
 
On February 11, 2007, Portuguese voters were asked the same question as in 
1998: “Do you agree with decriminalization of abortion when requested on women’s de-
mand, up to 10 weeks of pregnancy, and performed in an authorized clinic” (Interna-
tional Viewpoint 2007). As evidenced in Table 1, the results of the referendum were as fol-
lows: 59.24 percent of people voted “yes” to legalize abortion, while 40.76 percent voted 
“no” to keep the existing law (Marktest 2007). This time 56.4 percent of eligible voters 
abstained from voting, which meant that although people voted “yes” in significant 
numbers, the vote was not validated because of the country’s high abstention rate.  
 
Table 1 indicates that the results of the referendum reveal a striking division be-
tween northern and southern districts. There were some important differences from the 
1998 referendum in three districts, Castelo Branco, Leiria, and Oporto: all changed their 
vote from “no” to “yes.” All other districts did not change their vote from the 1998 refer-
endum, although many districts that voted “no” in 1998 narrowed the difference be-
tween the number of “yes” and “no” votes from 1998 to 2007. Urban areas were the most 
                                                 
17Excerpt form report by Diario de Noticias (2007). “Portugal’s prime minister targets young peo-
ple in abortion campaign,” BBC Monitoring Europe, February 7. Available at: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.library.anselm.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?ri
sb=21_T2864693200&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T28
64693203&cisb=22_T2864693202&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=1 (accessed 
September 2007).  
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likely to vote to legalize abortion; in the district of Lisbon, 71.47 percent of Portuguese 
voted to legalize abortion.  
 
Table 1: The Results of the 1998 and 2007 Referendums 
 
District Yes  No  Abstain 
  1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 
Aveiro  32.27 44.62 67.73 55.38 69.37 57.73 
Beja  78.17 83.90 21.83 16.10 77.04 60.17 
Braga 22.60  41.20  77.40  58.8  60.26  53.61 
Braganca 26.25 40.84 73.75 59.16 71.42 65.64 
Castelo 
Branco 
47.22 61.63 52.78 38.37 71.22 59.44 
Coimbra 52.94 62.91 47.06 37.09 72.67 59.94 
Évora  72.98 78.39 27.02 21.61 73.33 57.00 
Faro  69.59 73.64 30.41 26.36 77.62 61.19 
Guarda  29.92 46.74 70.08 53.26 67.99 61.54 
Leiria  48.17 58.33 51.83 41.67 70.60 56.13 
Lisbon  67.97 71.47 32.03 28.53 65.53 51.33 
Portalegre  67.68 74.45 32.32 25.55 75.86 61.06 
Oporto  42.82 54.37 57.18 45.63 66.62 55.10 
Santarém 56.57 65.07 43.43 34.93 70.17 55.86 
Setúbal  81.89 81.99 18.11 18.01 66.63 51.52 
Viana Do 
Castelo 
26.21 40.41 73.79 59.59 65.91 60.36 
Vila  Real 23.97 38.11 76.03 61.89 68.72 64.84 
Viseu  24.22 38.51 75.78 61.49 69.63 62.35 
Açores  17.34 30.74 82.66 69.26 72.87 70.50 
Madeira  23.97 34.56 76.03 65.44 67.24 61.43 
Source: Results gathered from Marktest.com  
 
Several explanations have been offered as to why the abstention rate remained 
high. Some pointed to the rainy weather the day of the referendum. Others suggested 
that pressure from the Catholic Church on voters to abstain if they did not feel they 
could vote “no” was successful (BBC News 2007). A third line of thinking was offered by 
Pedro Magalhaes, who observed that “referendums, unlike regular elections, often deal 
with complicated issues, and people who are not politically motivated or informed have 
a problem making the decision to vote” (The New York Times 2007). 
 
Although the abstention rate was again too high to validate the vote, there was a 
significant increase in the number of voters in comparison to the 1998 referendum. Con-
sequently, Socialist party leaders decided to forge ahead with their plan to legalize abor-
tion despite their failed attempt at the referendum. Prime Minister Socrates insisted that 
the reform movement would continue and a new law would be proposed in parlia- 
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ment.18 Socrates’ Socialist majority in the National Assembly, in alliance with progres-
sive forces in parliament, supported the change. In April of 2007, Portugal’s President, 
Anibal Cavaco Silva, signed the abortion bill allowing abortion in the first ten weeks of 
pregnancy. 
 
Conclusion  
 
There are several important factors regarding why the Portuguese finally voted 
to liberalize abortion laws in 2007. Let us suggest the following four: first, the influence 
of the Prime Minister at the time of each referendum; second, the strategy of pro-life and 
pro-choice groups; third, the nature of Portuguese Catholicism and finally, public sym-
pathy given to women who were brought to trial over abortion between 1998 and 2007.  
 
First, the influence of the Prime Minister. The 1998 abortion referendum was 
heavily influenced by Socialist Prime Minister António Guterres. His public opposition 
to legalizing abortion greatly damaged efforts by other Socialist members to mobilize 
voters.19 The split in the party, coupled with the influence of Guterres on the Portuguese 
people, contributed to the defeat of the pro-choice agenda that year. In 2005 Prime Min-
ister Jose Socrates used the promise of a new abortion referendum as part of his platform 
in that year’s election, calling clandestine abortions “a national disgrace” (Financial Times 
2007). When Socrates became Prime Minister, he scheduled a new referendum, and 
called upon Portugal to move toward more “modern” customs.20 This strategy proved to 
be effective, especially for the many Portuguese who compare their country with Spain, 
which has a much more liberal abortion law.  
 
Second, the change in strategy of the pro-choice groups. The abortion debate in 
2007 was framed around the tragedy of clandestine abortions and their often deadly im-
pact on the lives of Portuguese women, and not on the fate of the unborn child. This was 
of great tactical and symbolic importance for the pro-choice movement. In addition, they 
let the people know that an estimated 4,000 Portuguese women were traveling to Bada-
joz, Spain, to have abortions in the Los Acros clinic each year.21 The fate of those Portu-
guese women who could not afford to travel to Spain for abortions was dire:  abortions 
in backstreet clinics, causing many deaths each year (The New York Times 2007). In addi-
tion, women who had undergone abortions told stories of their clandestine abortions 
and the serious complications that arose from their decision. With these strategies in 
                                                 
18Socrates faced opposition from Patrido Popular leader, Jose Ribeiro e Castro, who claimed that, 
“Socrates will be responsible for this sad chapter in Portugal’s history, for insisting on a political 
move that has split Portuguese society” (The Toronto Star 2007). 
19(2007) “A Painful Choice,” The Economist Online, February 10. Available at:  
www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8686503 (accessed September 25, 2007). 
20By 2007, many European countries had adopted more liberal abortion laws, leaving only four 
countries without abortion on demand. Socrates focused on the Portuguese people’s desire to 
thrive among its European neighbors. He argued, “What we have to do now is what more devel-
oped nations did 20 or 30 years ago” (2007). “Emotions Run High of Portugal Abortion Vote,” 
Christian Post, February 10.  
21Yolanda Hernandes, director of the clinic, explained that “We try to solve a problem for women 
that they can not solve in their own country. Women who reject maternity look for a way to get 
rid of the pregnancy” (BBC News 2007).  
  12 
play, the results of the 2007 referendum were markedly different than just a decade be-
fore. In the 1998 referendum 48.7 percent of Portuguese voted “yes” to abortion but just 
a decade later 59.24 percent of Portuguese voted “yes.” Additionally, the abstention rate 
was much lower in the later referendum, which also helped progressive forces. 
 
Third, the nature of Portuguese Catholicism. The recent battle over abortion in 
Portugal  suggests that secular humanism is encroaching on what had been the terrain of 
the Roman Catholic Church. Secular forces are clearly altering the face of Roman Ca-
tholicism in Portugal, but we must hasten to add that Portuguese Catholicism has tradi-
tionally been thin at the official level. Faithful Portuguese Roman Catholics, most of 
whom live in the central and northern rural areas, and in the islands, have traditionally 
been more attracted to Nossa Senhora de Fátima—a hallmark of Portuguese spirituality—
or in venerating a local saint, especially Saint Anthony of Padua (who was actually born 
in Lisbon) rather than following official theological pronouncements issued in Rome, or 
from the Braga or the Lisbon archdioceses. 22 Almost fifty percent of baptized Catholics 
regularly attend Mass, and Portuguese still use the Church for baptisms, weddings and 
funerals in large numbers, but their faith experience continues to function at a more local 
rather than a doctrinal level; and they tend to remain unmoved by calls to political ac-
tion (Manuel and Mott, 2006).  
 
Fourth, a return to communal values. In the end, the pro-choice side successfully 
harmonized its rhetoric to certain traditional communal values found in Portuguese so-
ciety—namely compassion, solidarity and support—and, in so doing, forged a recovery 
of those values. A majority of Portuguese voted to reject the criminalization of abortion 
in order to provide compassion, solidarity and support for those women in crisis, pro-
tecting them from jail sentences and abortion-related deaths and injuries. In 2007 a ma-
jority of Portuguese voted to relax the ban on abortion, in part because the pro-choice 
forces had convinced them that abortion is a “necessary evil.” In that fashion the out-
come of the 2007 referendum on abortion represents both an embrace of secular moder-
nity by Portuguese civil society as well as a recovery of traditional communal values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22Apelo religioso não tem qualquer efeito no voto católico; Igreja Praticantes separam religião da política 
February 15, 2005; http://www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=502368&div_id=291 
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